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Cross-Examining the Truthful Witness:
The Ideal Within the Central Moral
Tradition of Lawyering
Robert P Lawry*
"There is only the fight to recover what has been lost And
found and lost again and again: and now, under conditions
That seem unpropitious. But perhaps neither gain nor loss,
For us, there is only the trying. The rest is not our business."
T. S. Eliot'
I. Introduction
A persistent crisis in the ordinary expectations of patterns of
living triggers a nostalgic yearning for the way it was. So Glendon.
So Kronman. Let me confess at once: me too. Except the critics
are right. The Golden Age of American lawyering that Glendon
sees in the 1950s and 1960s was hardly golden. It was "a regulated
cartel."2 And Glendon herself reminds us of its invidious discrimi-
nation. A partner at Cravath told her when she interviewed for a
job in the waning moments of that Golden Age: "'I couldn't bring
a girl in to meet Tom Watson [of IBM] any more than I could
bring a Jew."' 3 Presumably, to bring in a "black" would not even
have occurred to him. Of course, the practice had more stability
then and, surely, it was more genteel.
Anthony Kronman's nostalgia is for a lost ideal. Drawing on
Aristotelian moral and political thought, Kronman breathes rich,
intellectual life into the figure of the lawyer-statesman, a person of
practical wisdom, sound judgment, and resolute public-spiritedness.
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Professional Ethics, Case Western
Reserve University.
1. T.S. ELIOT, East Coker, in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS 1909-1950 at 128
(1971).
2. Richard A. Posner, Barflies, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 31, 1994, at 41.
3. MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 28 (1994).
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Historically, Kronman may be on firmer ground than Glendon.
The ideal of the lawyer-statesman had a hold on some lawyers who
actually achieved great fame as statesmen. The list Kronman
assembles, however, makes it clear that their fame came from their
positions as presidents, senators, cabinet holders, and judges, not
from their work as lawyers. Does the word "lawyer" or the word
"statesman" spring to mind when you hear the names Thomas
Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, John Marshall, James Madison,
Abraham Lincoln, Stephen Douglas, William Seward, Salmon
Chase, Daniel Webster, Henry Stimson, Dean Acheson, Cyrus
Vance, and Carla Hills? It is not that some of these people did not
have notable legal careers. Webster and Lincoln did. But Madison
hardly ever practiced, and Jefferson's practice was largely that of
a debt collector. Of course, that is the main problem with the list
and one problem with the ideal. It is difficult to see how the figure
of the lawyer-statesman is connected to the practice of law.
Nevertheless, almost everyone who reads these two books
seems to agree that both Glendon and Kronman have described the
current malaise among lawyers rather well. At the risk of oversim-
plifying two complex books, Glendon seems to have gotten the
externalities right, and Kronman, the internalities. Glendon shows
us what we can see if we look - and it doesn't look good.
Kronman bores right inside - and it just doesn't feel good. What
to do? I don't know. Neither, I'm afraid, do Glendon and
Kronman. Surely, we cannot return to a Golden Age that never
was, nor can we recover a lost ideal simply by articulating it. What
I can do, and what most of us can do, is take on one small job at
a time.
Glendon and Kronman look at the whole landscape. It is
daunting to look at the complex whole and even more daunting to
try to fix its countless broken parts. Although I mentioned earlier
that the critics of Glendon and Kronman are right, Glendon and
Kronman are also right. They have each articulated in multiple
ways what currently troubles us.
When I teach professional responsibility, I tell my students that
there are two dominant themes to the course. The first is profes-
sionalism. Stripped to its core, professionalism means we serve the
client and the public interest above self-interest. Money is always
secondary. Always. The second theme is the adversary system and
its implications. The adversary system is a system of adjudication
with a neutral decision-maker and partisan advocates. We often act
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in ways that are particularly partisan because the system is set up
that way; but our first obligation is to the processes, procedures,
and institutions of the law.4 How we work out the conflicts
between client and system is the essence of professional ethics. Oh,
and yes, our consciences are our own. Our advocacy can be hired.
Not our conscience.
I believe in those themes. I also believe that Glendon and
Kronman believe in them. However, ideas about the demands of
professionalism and the limits of advocacy must be argued for and
explored in context. In this essay, I will explore one particular
issue keeping Kronman's lawyer-statesman ideal in mind. I believe
this ideal has been a positive and discernible force in the central
moral tradition of lawyering.5 Therefore, I will examine one
particular ethical issue and attempt to locate the application of that
ideal within the vagaries of actual legal practice.
The issue I have chosen is one of the most difficult, especially
for criminal defense lawyers: how to cross-examine the truthful
witness.6 Here is a place for practical reason and nuanced judg-
ment. Here is a place where values clash and the lawyer-states-
man's public-spiritedness is tested. I conclude that we have gone
off-track within the past twenty-five years or so, at least in our
rhetoric about this subject and, most likely, with our practice, too.
With Kronman, I believe the way we talk and the ideals we set for
ourselves do much to shape the way we act and what we choose.
II. The Central Tradition
In the fourth edition of Francis Wellman's classic text, The Art
of Cross Examination,7 well-known trial lawyer Emory Buckner
summed up his view on the ethics of cross-examination as follows:
4. Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint
Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1162 (1958) [hereinafter Joint Report].
5. I believe the central moral tradition has been captured best in the Joint Report. ld.;
see Robert P. Lawry, The Central Moral Tradition of Lawyering, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 311
(1990).
6. Monroe Freedman describes it as "the most difficult and painful" of three issues he
identified many years ago as the "hardest questions" for the criminal defense lawyer.
MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYER'S ETHICS 161 (1990) [hereinafter
FREEDMAN]; Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966) [hereinafter Three
Hardest Questions].
7. FRANCIS L. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROSS-EXAMINATION (4th ed. 1936).
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The purpose of cross-examination should be to catch truth, ever
an elusive fugitive. If the testimony of a witness is wholly false,
cross-examination is the first step in an effort to destroy that
which is false. One should willingly accept that which he
believes to be true whether or not it damages his case. If the
testimony of a witness is false only in the sense that it exagger-
ates, distorts, garbles, or creates a wrong sense of proportion,
then the function of cross-examination is to whittle down the
story to its proper size and its proper relation to other facts. A
composite photograph of a man's face with its ears ten times
enlarged is not a true photograph of the man. If the cross-
examiner believes the story told to be true and not exaggerated,
and if the story changes counsel's appraisal of his client's case,
then what is indicated is not a "vigorous" cross-examination but
a negotiation for adjustment during the luncheon hour. If this
fails, counsel should accept the story and get his settlement by
the judgment of the court or verdict of the jury. No client is
entitled to have his lawyer score a triumph by superior wits
over a witness who the lawyer believes is telling the truth.
Lawyers can do more for the improvement of the administra-
tion of justice in their daily practice than by serving on commit-
tees or making speeches at bar associations, however helpful
that may be.8
In quick, bold strokes, these statements capture the essence of
the subject. First, the purpose of cross-examination is to "catch
truth," not to make the false look true and the true, false.9
Second, a lawyer should willingly accept the truth, "whether or not
it damages his case." Finally, "no client is entitled to have his
lawyer score a triumph by superior wits over a witness who the
lawyer believes is telling the truth." These quotations represent
moral positions based on a larger understanding than is typical
today of the adversary system and the lawyer's role in that system.
It captures the spirit of the famous 1958 Joint ABA-A.A.L.S.
Report on Professional Responsibility,"° which argues that the
lawyer as advocate "plays his role badly, and trespasses against the
obligations of professional responsibility, when his desire to win
8. Id. at 204-05. This pre-eminent book was first publicized by The Macmillan
Company in 1903 and has appeared in four editions and fifty printings during the past six
decades. Id. Publisher's Note (Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1962).
9. See Murray L. Schwartz, On Making the False Look True and the Trie, False, 41 Sw.
L.J. 1135 (1988).
10. Joint Report, supra note 4.
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leads him to muddy the headwaters of decision, when, instead of
lending a needed perspective to the controversy, he distorts and
obscures its true nature.""
Moreover, Buckner shows care and concern for the witnesses
themselves. Although couched in strategic language, he admonish-
es lawyers: "[T]here should be no place in cross-examination for
indignation, shouting, belligerent hostility."' 2  Throughout the
years, many textbooks and treatises echoed these sentiments: truth
should not be thwarted, and individuals caught up in the system
should be treated with courtesy and respect. 3 Even when concen-
trating on strategy and tactics, many authors still seem to espouse
positions which favor truth and respect over advantage. 4 More-
over, these authors do not distinguish between civil and criminal
trials when discussing the art and the ethics of cross-examination.
Briefly, this is the central moral tradition on the question of cross-
examination.
I am not arguing that, historically, there were not those who
believed otherwise. You only have to read Jerome Frank's Courts
on Trial for examples of those who hold a different view.'5 In
fact, reading Frank, you would be led to believe that what I call the
central moral tradition is not central at all. Frank writes:
[A]n experienced lawyer uses all sorts of stratagems to minimize
the effect on the judge or jury of testimony disadvantageous to
his client, even when the lawyer has no doubt of the accuracy
and honesty of that testimony. The lawyer considers it his duty
to create a false impression, if he can, of any witness who gives
such testimony.'6
Citing other authors, Frank goes on to give examples. Rapid cross-
examination may ruin the testimony of a "'truthful, honest"' but
"'over-cautious witness.""' 7 Lawyers may "try to prod an irritable
11. Id. at 1161. The Joint Report was influential in shaping the ABA's 1969 Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, as the many footnote references in the Code attest. See
generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969).
12. WELLMAN, supra note 7, at 206.
13. See, e.g., JAMES RAM, A TREATISE ON FACTS AS SUBJECTS OF INQUIRY BY A JURY
(4th Am. ed., New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1890); W.H. HYATr, HYATr ON TRIALS
(1924).
14. This idea was expressed in the early chapters of Wellman's book, particularly
chapter ten.
15. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 80-102 (1949).




but honest 'adverse' witness into displaying his undesirable charac-
teristics in their most unpleasant form, in order to discredit him
with the judge or jury." 8 If a witness has an inflated ego, the
lawyer "will 'deftly tempt the witness to indulge in his propensity
for exaggeration, so as to make him "hang himself ..... "19 Finally,
Frank quotes the great Wigmore:
An intimidating manner in putting questions ... may so coerce
or disconcert the witness that his answers do not represent his
actual knowledge on the subject. So also, questions which in
form or subject cause embarrassment, shame or anger in the
witness may unfairly lead him to such demeanor or utterances
that the impression produced by his statements does not do
justice to its real testimonial value.2"
The language quoted, of course, conveys Wigmore's disapproval of
such tactics. In fact, Frank himself disapproves. Before doing so,
however, he concludes:
These and other like techniques, you will find unashamedly
described in many manuals on trial tactics written by and for
eminently reputable trial lawyers. The purpose of these tactics
- often effective - is to prevent the trial judge or jury from
correctly evaluating the trustworthiness of witnesses and to shut
out evidence the trial court ought to receive in order to
approximate the truth.2'
Frank admits that it is "excessive" and a misdescription of "all
contemporary American trials" to say that "'one party or the other
is always supremely interested in misrepresenting, exaggerating or
suppressing the truth."'22 Nevertheless, is there not also a tradi-
tion here, one that might be seen as inconsistent, even opposed to
the Wellman-Buckner model I previously characterized as the
central moral tradition? Arguably, it is a tradition, but one that
has not been dominant as an ideal, at least until recently. And
there's the rub. The ascendancy of this minority view has all but
obliterated an ideal that always involved compromise and difficulty,
but was still able to inspire people of practical reasonableness.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. FRANK, supra note 15, at 82-83.
21. Id. at 85.
22. Id. at 87.
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Nevertheless, when the ideal goes, the heart goes too. It is the loss
of the lawyer-statesman ideal that Kronman laments, and rightly so.
III. Courvoisier's Case23
To recover the ideal, let me first resort to a description of a
famous nineteenth century English case.24 In 1840, a great hue
and cry erupted over the tactics used by English barrister Charles
Phillips in his defense of the valet Benjamin Francois Courvoisier
for the murder of his employer, Lord William Russell." In the
aftermath of this trial, many of the most important issues surround-
ing the ethics of trying a criminal case were clarified and some
perimeters set. Of considerable concern were the ethics of cross-
examination.
In Courvoisier's case, Phillips initially believed that his client
was innocent.26 Why he believed this is not clear. One reason
may have stemmed from the barrister-solicitor split in the English
bar. Phillips was "briefed" on the case by a solicitor and, most
likely, did not even talk to the client before trial.27 Therefore, he
was probably "instructed" as to the client's innocence.28 After the
first day of trial, wherein Phillips had cross-examined two key
prosecution witnesses, Courvoisier confessed his guilt to Phillips.29
Nevertheless, he refused to plead guilty and expected his lawyer "to
defend [him] to the utmost."3 Shaken by the revelation, Phillips
proceeded to do an unusual thing. The case was being tried by a
jury and two judges. One judge was the Lord Chief Justice Tindal,
who presided. The other was Mr. Baron Parke, who "assisted...
Tindal in reading evidence to the jury, made some comments to the
jury, and made some rulings on questions of law."31 Phillips went
to Parke, told him of the confession, and asked him whether he
should withdraw from the case.32 Judge Parke was "much an-
23. Regina v. Courvoisier, 173 Eng. Rep. 869 (1840).
24. For a lucid and powerful rendition of the story, see DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE
CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER (1973).
25. Id. at 141-45.
26. Id. at 62.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. MELLINKOFF, supra note 24, at 132.
30. Id. at 133.
31. Id. at 135.
32. Id. at 134-35.
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noyed" at Phillips for this breach of client confidence;33 yet, he
told him that he was bound to defend the client, and in doing so,
"to use all fair arguments arising on the evidence." 34  The mean-
ing of that phrase is at the heart of the issue I am discussing.
It should be noted that it was only four years before Courvoi-
sier's case that Parliament had passed the Prisoner's Counsel
Bill,35 allowing lawyers to speak to juries on behalf of accused
felons.36 Moreover, there was a nagging public question at that
time as to whether a lawyer could ethically defend a person the
lawyer knew to be guilty of the crime charged.37 On the surface,
that question has not troubled the professional conscience of
lawyers in England or in America.38 In both countries criminal
defendants have a right to a lawyer, and lawyers have a duty to
give those clients the best possible defense.39 The issue that still
plagues us, however, is what it means for a lawyer to give the best
possible defense to a guilty client. We know lawyers cannot
introduce perjury or false evidence into trial; but can they portray
a false case or perpetrate false inferences by cross-examining
known truthful witnesses in an attempt to make them look like
liars, or at least mistaken in reporting what is the truth?
Before Courvoisier's confession to his lawyer, Phillips had
already cross-examined two key prosecution witnesses. The first
was Sarah Mancer, the maid, who had testified to events surround-
33. The confidentiality rules governing lawyers' conduct were less clear in those days.
Id. at 138. Today, in the precise circumstances facing Phillips, it is still not clear what the
lawyer should do. In cases involving perjury discovered after the fact, the lawyer has an
obligation to "take reasonable remedial measures." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCr Rule 3.3(a) (1995). Whatever is done, it is clear that the perjury cannot be
allowed to stand. See id. Rule 3.3 cmt. The lawyer's duty to take action continues "to the
conclusion of the proceeding, even if compliance requires the disclosure of [confidential]
information.- Id. Rule 3.3(b). Analogously, if the lawyer learns during trial that his own
cross-examination has produced some improper result, the lawyer may have an obligation
to fix it. Phillips seemed to have created the suggestion during his cross-examination of the
maid, Sarah Mancer, that she was implicated in the murder. Arguably, Phillips remedied this
matter in his closing remarks to the jury. See infra text accompanying notes 64-65.
34. MELLINKOFF, supra note 24, at 140.
35. Act for Enabling Persons Indicted of Felony to Make Their Defence By Counsel or
Attorney, 1836, 6 & 7 Will. 4, ch. 114 (Eng.).
36. MELLINKOFF, supra note 24, at 57.
37. See, e.g., id. at 141-49. Mellinkoff provides a glimpse of this question with
perspectives from the popular and academic press, as well as from the religions establish-
ment.
38. Id. at 184.
39. Id. at 106.
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ing the discovery of the deceased, as well as details about the
demeanor and behavior of the accused." Mancer appeared "pale,
breathless and trembling in every fibre of her frame."'" Phillips
exploited some odd expressions Mancer used to test her impartiali-
ty and reliability. 2 Some said he went further, suggesting the
maid herself may have been implicated in the crime. 3
The second witness was a police officer, constable John
Baldwin. Baldwin had testified truthfully that there had been no
disturbance of dust on the roof of the house next door and,
therefore, no outsider could have come into the house that way."
However, he also testified falsely that he did not know about the
reward money being offered on the case. 5 Phillips demonstrated
forcefully the perjury on the second point,46 casting so much doubt
on the truth of the first point that the chief judge charged the jury
not to believe anything to which the constable had testified.47
After Courvoisier's confession, Phillips cross-examined a third
witness, which raised additional concerns about the subject we are
investigating. Charlotte Piolaine was a surprise witness at the
trial.48 Indeed, Phillips had only fifteen minutes warning before
she was announced.49 Her testimony was that she had employed
Courvoisier (under the name "Jean") for a brief period approxi-
mately four years prior to trial; that recently he had visited her and
asked to leave a parcel with her; that she was curious about the
parcel from something she had read in a French newspaper; that
"Jean" had not returned for the parcel; and, that she opened the
parcel and discovered silverware, later identified as having been
stolen from Lord Russell's house.50  Although Phillips was
reasonably certain Piolaine was telling the truth regarding the
package, he had no idea of her motive, nor whether she was lying
or mistaken on any specific point. Indeed, he was not certain she
was not an accomplice. Therefore, he attacked her credibility,
40. Id. at 73-81.
41. MELLINKOFF, supra note 24, at 73.
42. Id. at 73-81.
43. Id. at 192.
44. Id. at 82.
45. Id. at 82-86.
46. MELLINKOFF, supra note 24, at 86.
47. Id. at 208.
48. Id. at 88. Charlotte Piolaine was Courvoisier's first employer in England. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 93-99.
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suggesting the hotel she kept might be a gaming house, and
probing her motive in coming so late to the trial.5'
Courvoisier was a famous case. After it came to light that the
defendant had confessed his guilt to his lawyer, the press and public
opinion combined to vilify Phillips. The London Examiner, for
example, was particularly hard on the lawyer. A full nine years
after Courvoisier was convicted and executed, the Examiner
renewed its attack.52 Up to this point, Phillips had suffered in
silence; however, after receiving a letter from Sam Warren, an
American lawyer who stoutly defended Phillips's conduct, Phillips
published Warren's letter in addition to his own, elaborating his
defense to charges of unethical conduct.53
In 1854, Judge George Sharswood of Pennsylvania published
An Essay on Professional Ethics,54 one of the most influential
books on lawyer's ethics ever published in the United States. In it,
Sharswood refers to Courvoisier in a section of the book dealing
with fidelity to clients, and appends a brief summation of the facts
and the text of the Warren and Phillips letters.5 Likewise, David
Mellinkoff's book on the case, published in 1973, brings to bear on
it both historical and ethical reflection. I recite this subsequent
commentary to suggest the importance of the case to the ethical
tradition of lawyering.
In his defense, Phillips addresses three points that were raised
by the press against him. First, it was charged that Phillips should
have given up the brief as soon as Courvoisier confessed. The
abstract principle that every person is entitled to a lawyer was, of
course, a customary rule of the English Bar. Indeed, the first press
comments on Phillips's conduct accepted the principle without
critique and generally praised Phillips for doing a good job in tough
51. MELLINKOFF, supra note 24, at 93-100.
52. Id. at 187.
53. Id. Ironically, it was this same Sam Warren, law partner of Louis Brandeis, who was
later to die as a result of "keen cross-examination" of him in a tragic family trust dispute.
Noonan, Distinguished Alumni Lecture-Other People's Morals: The Lawyer's Conscience,
48 TENN. L. REV. 234-36 (1981).
54. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (5th ed., Philadelphia,
T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1896). Sharswood's Essay is cited as the dominant influence on
the ABA's first Canons of Ethics (1908), and he "posited differences between personal and
professional morality that remain central to contemporary debates over legal ethics."
DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 112 (2d ed. 1995).
55. SHARSWOOD, supra note 54, at 103-07, 183-96.
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circumstances. 5 6 However, after the public and certain religious
leaders excoriated him for doing so, the press soon followed suit.
No doubt some would do the same today. Yet, the principle that
everyone has a right to counsel is deeply embedded in our tradi-
tions. The real issue then, and the real issue now, would be: how
does a lawyer try the case when the truth comes to light during the
trial, but after the lawyer has already cross-examined witnesses.
Baron Parke's position remains the central one. Stay the course.
Do what you can using "all fair arguments arising on the evi-
dence."57 In fact, writing in 1902, the American, George Warve-
lie, stated that the precedent was settled in Courvoisier's case.58
Even in 1840, Phillips argued that there was widespread agreement
in the profession that he was right to stay the course as counsel for
the accused.59
The second accusation that Phillips met was that he wrongly
appealed to God as to "his belief in Courvoisier's innocence," even
after the defendant had confessed to his lawyer.' The short
answer Phillips gave was that he did not say this.6' A customary
rule of advocacy forbids a trial lawyer from giving his personal
opinion on the case at hand. It was the rule then. It is the rule
now.
62
The third accusation was disposed of just like the second.
Phillips was accused of casting the guilt for the crime on an
innocent person, the maid, Sarah Mancer.63 Of course, the
accusation did not have any bite when Phillips actually cross-
examined Mancer. At that time, he believed his client was
innocent and could not be sure of Mancer's guilt. Nevertheless, the
accusation persisted that he blamed her in his jury summation, after
he knew his client was guilty. Not only did Phillips deny that he
accused Mancer before the jury,' he quoted himself as saying
precisely the opposite, using contemporary newspaper accounts to
demonstrate the point. In one quoted account, he said to the jury:
56. MELLINKOFF, supra note 24, at 141.
57. Id. at 140.
58. Id. at 176 (quoting G. WARVELLE, ESSAYS IN LEGAL ETHICS 134-38 (1902)).
59. SHARSWOOD, supra note 54, at 190 (reprinting Phillips's letter).
60. MELLINKOFF, supra note 24, at 220.
61. Id. at 221.
62. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(c)(4) (1986); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(c).




[L]et me do myself justice, and others justice, by now stating
that in the whole course of my narrative with which I must
trouble you, I beg you would not suppose that I am in the least
degree seeking to cast the crime upon any of the witnesses.
God forbid that any breath of mine should send persons
depending on the public for subsistence into the world with a
tainted character.65
The issue of the ethics of cross-examining the truthful witness
was not raised by Phillips in his refutation. Perhaps it had gotten
lost in the revised attack in the press, but it surely was part of the
original attack. So let us re-visit each of the three crucial cross-
examinations to learn what we can about Phillips's ethics and the
central tradition.
A. Sarah Mancer
At the time of Sarah Mancer's cross-examination, Phillips
believed his client to be innocent. In her signed statement, Mancer
said: "I saw his Lordship dead murdered in bed., 66 She had
crossed out the word "dead" and replaced it with "murdered." Yet
she testified she did not say she ever saw the man "murdered.7
67
Phillips exploited this testimony, suggesting that perhaps Mancer
was not truthful. He added further suspicion by contrasting
precisely what she said and did the morning the body was discov-
ered with what Courvoisier said and did.68 David Mellinkoff
summarized as follows:
By the end of Mr. Phillips' cross-examination the tidy package
of Miss Mancer's story was somewhat crumpled. Whether she
knew more than she had yet told was far from clear. Certainly
cross-examination had raised questions not raised on direct. At
the very least her actions on the day of the discovery of the
murder were confused and subject to unfavorable inference.69
Since all of this was prior to Phillips's knowledge of his client's
guilt, such probing and exploiting were well within Emory Buck-
ner's description of proper cross-examination: to catch the elusive
truth or at least to whittle down the story to its proper size and its
65. SHARSWOOD, supra note 54, at 194.
66. MELLINKOFF, supra note 24, at 192.
67. Id. at 73-74.




proper relation to other facts.7" Moreover, any suggestion by
Phillips that the maid was involved with the crime was completely
disavowed in Phillips's summation. By that time, of course, he
knew the truth. It would have been unconscionable to knowingly
accuse an innocent person of a crime she did not commit.
B. Constable Baldwin
The testimony of the second witness, Constable Baldwin, also
took place before Phillips knew the truth.7 Baldwin testified that
he checked the roof for footprints, but saw only undisturbed dust
and no broken tiles, thus pointing to an inside job.72 However, he
also testified that he did not know of the reward being offered for
conviction of the murderer.73 The testimony about the reward
was folly. The reward was public knowledge, and other police
officers knew of its existence.74 Phillips skillfully cross-examined
the witness to prove he was lying. Perjury, of course, is something
that should always be exposed. The tradition is clear on this.
Moreover, there was evidence likely planted by the police, linking
Courvoisier with the murder.75 There had been a thorough search
made of Courvoisier's trunk after the discovery of the murder, and
nothing suspicious was found.7 6  A reward was offered. Then,
while Courvoisier was in jail, another search of the same trunk
found bloody gloves, handkerchiefs, and a shirt-front.77 If ever
rough cross-examination is appropriate, it is to expose corrupt
police work. Even if Phillips knew that Courvoisier was guilty, this
kind of cross-examination is warranted for the same reason we
have an exclusionary rule: to keep police work more honest.
C. Mrs. Piolaine
The third witness, Mrs. Piolaine, was a surprise.78 Phillips had
no time to prepare or double-check her story. He attacked her
credibility by suggesting it was nearly impossible that she had not
70. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
71. See MELLINKOFF, supra note 24, at 205.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 83-85.
74. Id. at 205.
75. Id. at 90, 205.
76. MELLINKOFF, supra note 24, at 205.
77. Id. at 90.
78. Id. at 88.
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made any connection between the parcel and the famous trial
before the afternoon of the first day of trial.79 He also suggested
she was an unsavory character by asking if the hotel she ran was a
"gaming house."80 The import was that there was more to this
witness than meets the eye. Although Phillips went overboard in
cross-examining Mrs. Piolaine, he did so because she was a surprise
witness. He knew very little about her and was simply reacting to
the circumstances.
Let Mellinkoff have the final word on both the cross-examina-
tion of the police and of Mrs. Piolaine:
Phillips tested the evidence, questioning the testimony that
came from men encouraged by the hope of special reward to
somehow produce evidence that would convict. Questioning all
the possibilities of perjury, not good perjury or bad perjury,
perjury directed to conviction of the guilty or perjury to convict
the innocent or perjury by habit, but all perjury, all misjudg-
ment, all chance of error. In such a process, some mud. Unfair
to Charlotte Piolaine. As it turned out, unquestionably. But as
she comes to the stand a witness out of nowhere, the defense
makes one quick calculation. Regardless of what my man has
done, he does not have to submit to conviction by lies or
mistakes. How do I know what motivates this woman, or where
the police have found her at the 11th hour? If defense counsel
weighs too cautiously the undoubted risks of giving offense, in
this and the case of every other witness, he loses all effective-
ness. False witness is not packed standard. It comes chic and
seedy, horny pawed and manicured, virginal and dissolute, bald,
crewcut, and bearded. The lawyer makes his quick decision,
and in doubt that decision is weighted for him on the side of his
client. He may make mistakes, and those mistakes too must go
into the accounting of a system of justice. The need for
competent counsel with guts, overawed neither by popular
clamor for a victim nor by the majesty and force of official
accusation, brushes now lightly, now sharply against other and
equally urgent requirements of a system of justice.8'
Although this language is not the calm and balanced prose of Tony
Kronman, it strives in the same direction. Both system and client
79. Id. at 94-99.
80. Id.
81. MELLINKOFF, supra note 24, at 210.
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must be served. "False witness is not packed standard." 2 Neither
is truth. Testimony must be whittled at to get a rough approxima-
tion. This is where good judgment, respect for persons, vigorous
defense, and an overriding sense of obligation to the processes,
procedures, and institutions of the law combine to push first in one
direction (the perjury of the police must be exposed); then to
withdraw (an innocent person must never be wrongfully con-
demned); then to push once again in the pressure of the moment
(the client did give her the package, but was she hiding something
important, too?). Judgments on the specifics will vary, and a
blanket rule cannot capture all the complexity of these kinds of
cases. Yet, some principles are beacons: perjury must be exposed
and the innocent cannot be blamed.
IV. Off the Tract
So where and when did we get off the track? Oddly, perhaps
coincidentally, I think I can document the time and the progression.
It occurred within the past twenty-five years. So Glendon and
Kronman are not bad historians after all. The place to look? The
three editions of the prestigious American Bar Association's Stan-
dards for Criminal Justice Prosecution Function and Defense
Function.
In the first edition, adopted in 1971, Standard 7.6(b) for the
defense function reads as follows:
A Lawyer's belief that the witness is telling the truth does not
necessarily preclude appropriate cross-examination in all
circumstances, but may affect the method and scope of cross-
examination. He should not misuse the power of cross-
examination or impeachment by employing it to discredit or
undermine a witness if he knows the witness is testifying
truthfully.
83
The commentary to this provision was so lengthy and replete
with ethical concerns, it could have been written by Emory
Buckner. First, it was clearly stated that "the high purpose" of
cross-examination and impeachment is to expose "falsehood, not to
destroy truth or the reputation of a known truthful witness.
'' 4
82. Id.
83. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 7.6(b) (1st
ed. 1971) [hereinafter 1971 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE].
84. Id. Standard 7.6(b) commentary at 272.
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There was an awareness that lawyers "may believe that the
temperament, personality or inexperience of the witness provide an
opportunity, by adroit cross-examination, to confuse the witness
and undermine his testimony in the eyes of the jury."85 However,
"it is not proper to use those tools to destroy the truth, or to seek
to confuse or embarrass the witness under these circumstances."8
In short, "methods of impeachment against a witness who had
testified truthfully so undermines the administration of justice that
it should be avoided., 87  Finally, it was understood that these
complex matters are "subjective," and "largely unenforceable.,
88
They are, therefore, "addressed essentially to conscience and
honor," even though "[e]xperienced advocates and judges can, over
a period of time, identify the lawyer who practices in conformity
with high standards as distinguished from those who do not. '89
Less than ten years later, the second edition changed the
operative language of what became Standard 4-7.6(b) by removing
the second sentence of the former provision. The language that
admonished criminal defense lawyers not to misuse cross-examina-
tion "to discredit or undermine" the truthful witness was deleted
because "[t]here are some cases where, unless counsel challenges
the prosecution's known truthful witnesses, there will be no
opposition to the prosecution's evidence, and the defendant will be
denied an effective defense."9 The commentary to the standard
repeated portions of the first edition, stating that there is no duty
for counsel to "try to impair or destroy the credibility" of a truthful
witness.9' It further admonished the lawyer to avoid this and like
tactics, but only if this can be done while still providing "an
effective defense for the accused."'92 In fact, the commentary went
further, stating:
[W]here the defendant has admitted guilt to the lawyer and
does not plan to testify, and the lawyer simply intends to put




88. 1971 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 83, Standard 7.6(b)
commentary at 273.
89. Id.
90. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-7.6(b) (2d
ed. 1980).




examination of the prosecution's witnesses is essential. Indeed,
were counsel in this circumstance to forgo vigorous cross-
examination of the prosecution's witnesses, counsel would
violate the clear duty of zealous representation that is owed to
the client.93
Thus, there appeared to be a shift from an aspiration not to under-
mine truthful witnesses, to a duty to do so, at least in some cases.
Nevertheless, the black-letter Standard still did not explicitly say
that such a duty existed.
In 1991 the third edition of the Defense Standards was passed.
Standard 4-7.6(b) is now stark: "Defense counsel's belief or
knowledge that the witness is telling the truth does not preclude
cross-examination., 94 Though some lip service is paid to ethics,
the commentary is written largely in terms of tactics, repeating
much of the language quoted above in describing the commentary
in the second edition. To compare the language of the third
edition to that of the first is to inhabit a vastly different moral
universe. The vision in the third edition is extreme role differentia-
tion, focusing on zealous representation, virtually ignoring moral
duties to other people or to the truth-seeking function of the
adversary system.
What has happened to account for the change in moral vision
between that articulated in the first edition of the ABA's Defense
Function Standards, adopted in 1971, and the third edition, adopted
in 1991? What happened in twenty years? What happened is what
often happens in law and in life: the minority opinion became the
majority opinion. Moreover, it should not be thought that this
change really occurred over the period of 1971-1991. The two
different moral visions that are caught in the first and the third
editions of the ABA Standards have existed side-by-side for a long
time, as I previously suggested by the contrasting quotations from
Emory Buckner and Jerome Frank.95
The dual concerns for truth-finding and for the rights of
individual participants in the system have needed adjustment from
time to time in Anglo-American legal history, with concerns for the
rights of criminal defendants making steady advances over the
93. Id. at 4-93 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-
101(A)(1), EC 7-10 (1980)).
94. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-7.6(b) (3d
ed. 1991) [hereinafter 1991 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE].
95. See supra notes 12, 16 and accompanying text.
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years. Moreover, a fiercer sort of adversariness has been on the
rise in civil matters since the latter part of the nineteenth century,
when lawyers began to represent huge corporate interests.96
Whatever the historical confluence of pressures and arguments, the
appropriate moral stance of the lawyer, representing clients in an
adversarial system of justice, has been the subject of debate as
changes in procedures and substantive rights have occurred..
Nevertheless, the current issues are not very different from those
that have been argued historically. What has changed is the ideal.
The 1971 Standards admit that such matters are "subjective ...
largely unenforceable . . . addressed essentially to professional
conscience and honor."'97 The commentary begins with these
words: "The ethic of our legal tradition has long recognized that
there are limitations on the manner in which witnesses should be
examined beyond those which are contained in the rules of
evidence." 98
The 1991 edition begins with the same words. The sentence
that follows, however, states that "[w]itnesses should not be
subjected to degrading, demeaning, or otherwise invasive or
insulting questioning unless counsel honestly believes that such
questioning may prove beneficial to his or her client's case."99
Appeals to honor and conscience are gone. In place of the
lawyer's discretion and judgment is an admonition to degrade,
demean, invade, and insult if there is any tactical advantage to be
gained by the client. I suggest there may be tactical advantages in
casting the guilt on an innocent. Is that fair game, too? It seems
as if the struggle to balance competing values is over in light of the
history of the ABA Standards. But it is not over. There is no lost
cause because there is no gained cause: "There is only the fight to
recover what has been lost, and found, and lost again.""
96. See, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41
VAND. L. REV. 697 (1988).
97. 1971 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 83, Standard 7.6(b).
98. Id. Standard 7.6(b) commentary at 270-71.
99. 1991 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 94, Standard 4-7.6(b)
commentary at 224.
100. T.S. ELIOT, East Coker, in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS 1909-1950, supra
note 1, at 128.
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V. Adversariness and Aristotle
Although historical in sweep and focused on a precise issue of
lawyer's ethics, this essay is neither history nor ethics. It is an
attempt to lay bare the way an ethical ideal becomes embedded in
practice. It is also an attempt at graphics. Professors Glendon and
Kronman have pointed to a malaise and crisis. In contrast, I have
focused on one issue, attempting to illustrate how an ideal gets
transformed into a crude ideology. That ideology goes under
various guises, but the model of "neutral partisanship" captures it
well enough. Under that model of lawyering, the lawyer is not
responsible for ends chosen by the client, nor for the means used
to accomplish those ends, as long as they do not run afoul of the
rules of law or the rules of ethics.' Part of the problem is the
notion of "rules" of ethics. It is a decidedly un-Aristotelian idea.
It belies judgments made in complex situations by professional
lawyers, who are trying to accommodate a variety of conflicting
values in their everyday practice.
Here, another dose of history is illustrative. When the ABA
decided to promulgate a code of ethics in 1908, it dubbed the
document, Canons of Ethics. When Henry Drinker wrote his legal
ethics book in 1953, he placed an epigram at the front of the text
from Lord Moulton, which read: "True civilization is measured by
the extent of Obedience to the Unenforceable.' 1 2 But the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, the latest ABA version of an ethics
code, was sold as "law for lawyers.'13 Recently, the American
Law Institute embarked on an effort to restate the law for law-
yers."°  Thus, in our quest to make the ethics rules "enforce-
able," we have made them into rules of law.
Aristotle knew better. And the lawyer-statesman ideal is
Aristotelian. Good decisions depend on experience, judgment, a
lived tradition, embedded ideals, and character. Principles are
necessary, too. But as Ronald Dworkin has reminded us, principles
have weight and push us in a certain direction, while rules apply in
101. RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 54, at 135-40.
102. HENRY DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 2 (1953).
103. Ray Patterson announced the theme before the Model Rules were drafted. Ray L.
Patterson, Wanted: A New Code of Professional Responsibility, 63 A.B.A. J. 639 (1977).




an all or nothing fashion.1 5 Thus, the answers will not come
mechanically if we look to principles rather than to rules. This is
not to deny that we need clear rules for handling certain kinds of
problems. Rather, it is to point to an issue like cross-examination
and simply deny that a rule can be drafted that will take into
account all of the competing values and contextual subtleties.
"Neutral partisanship" will not cut it. Embodying that model into
a hard rule of ethics produces Monroe Freedman's answer to the
issue of cross-examining the truthful witness."
Life and death issues aside, Freedman maintains that the
lawyer has a strict ethical obligation to cross-examine the truthful
witness to make her look mistaken, or a liar, or worse,'0 7 if
"counsel honestly believes that such questioning may prove
beneficial to his or her client's case."' ' If Emory Buckner could
have written the commentary to the ABA Standards dealing with
this issue in 1971, then, surely, Monroe Freedman could have been
the author of the 1991 version. Interestingly, Freedman goes to
great lengths to try to establish that both the Model Code and the
Model Rules presently require vigorous cross-examination of
truthful witnesses, and that it is the morally right thing to do; yet,
he admits that he personally can no longer vigorously cross-
examine a truthful prosecutrix in a rape case, so he stopped taking
these cases."° This is curious. Freedman admits the injury done
to the prosecutrix is "severe," and he just doesn't seem to have the
stomach for it. Or the heart. Aristotle would have Freedman
examine the emotional as well as the intellectual component of his
ethical makeup. Perhaps some re-adjustment in the nature of John
Rawls's "reflective equilibrium" is in order."0  Of course, the
problem is rooted in a simplistic, utterly modern conception of
what the adversary system is and what it means, and its implica-
tions for lawyers.
Freedman's description of the adversary system begins with a
shorthand version of the standard account, focusing on the dispute
105. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 24 (1977).
106. See Three Hardest Questions, supra note 6, at 1474-75.
107. Id.
108. See supra text accompanying note 99.
109. FREEDMAN, supra note 6, at 168 n.20.
110. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48-53 (1971). Rawls argued that there must




resolution function of the system, and emphasizing the various roles
played by judge, jury, and advocates. Within this standard account,
there are disagreements among scholars about what is essential to
the system and what is not."1' Therefore, arguments about
change or reform in the system often involve descriptive and
normative elements that are not always sorted out clearly. Freed-
man, however, does not deal with these issues; instead, he moves
quickly to equate the adversary system of adjudication with the
entire United States constitutional structure."2 His special focus
is on "rights." Freedman explains, "[Tihe adversary system
represents far more than a simple model for resolving disputes.
Rather, it consists of a core of basic rights that recognize and
protect the dignity of the individual in a free society.'' 3  Now,
Freedman's position represents a confusion of some importance.
It involves a blurring of lines between matters that must be kept
apart analytically, and that are different factually. The adversary
system is a system of public adjudication of disputes, with an
emphasis on different actors playing different roles. 14  The
Constitution is the structure of our governmental system. Constitu-
tional rights, embodied first in the Bill of Rights and elaborated
thereafter in other amendments to the Constitution and Supreme
Court decisions, are fundamental safeguards that "recognize and
protect the dignity of the individual in a free society." That
constitutional rights are vindicated through our adversary system is
established, but to equate those rights with the system that
vindicates them collapses important distinctions between means and
ends. Rights are also vindicated through rules of procedure and
evidence, yet those rules are not equated with the right, nor with
the system itself, although the rules of procedure or of evidence
must be altered sometimes when they substantially block the path
to vindication." 5 Not to recognize these distinctions is to risk
missing the true issues at hand.
111. The main disputants are collected in Stephen Landsman's Readings on Adversarial
Justice: The American Approach to Adjudication 15-19, 40-76 (1988).
112. FREEDMAN, supra note 6, at 13.
113. Id.
114. Lon Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 34-36, 39-45 (H.
Berman ed., 1971).
115. Clearly, this is why the Supreme Court determined that an exclusionary rule of
evidence is constitutionally mandated when authorities seize evidence in violation of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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One current example of the confusion is the debate over the
recent change to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under the amended version, counsel, on their own initiative, must
turn over the names of witnesses and the location and categories of
documents "relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in
the pleading."'' 1 6 This is not an attack on the foundation of the
adversary system, only a change in a procedural rule designed to
expedite the exchange of information before trial and to create a
more just and more efficient system of adjudication."7  There
may be good reasons for arguing against amended Rule 26, but the
undermining of the adversary system is not one of them.
Equating the adversary system with constitutional rights is
insufficient for Freedman. He goes even further by equating a
lawyer's ethical duty with the protection of those rights. This is the
theory Freedman uses to argue for a lawyer's duty to treat client
perjury and the destruction of truthful witnesses as rights protected
by a lawyer's duty of confidentiality. It is apparent that the
Constitution undergirds the adversary system, rights, and lawyers'
ethics in a strange and confusing amalgam for Freedman:
The rights that comprise the adversary system include personal
autonomy, the effective assistance of counsel, equal protection
of the laws, trial by jury, the right to call and to confront
witnesses, and the right to require the government to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and without the use of
compelled self-incrimination." 8
Clearly, several of the rights identified above are rights
constitutionally granted under our criminal justice system, but the
meaning of those rights for defense lawyers is not axiomatic,
though Freedman thinks so. Moreover, these arguments simply
have no applicability to the civil justice system. Again, Freedman
thinks otherwise. In fact he excoriates Charles Wolfram, who
modestly suggested that the criminal defense lawyer "may attack
the credibility of a truthful witness" while casting extreme doubt
116. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a).
117. See William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, The Adversary Process and Discovery
Reform, 50 U. PITr. L. REV. 703 (1989).
118. FREEDMAN, supra note 6, at 13. For good measure, Freedman claims due process
of law is the substantial equivalent of the adversary system. Id. (citing GEOFFREY HAZARD,
ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 122 (1978)).
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that the principle "should be extended to civil cases."" 9 Freed-
man asks rhetorically:
If we were to adopt a special rule for civil cases, should it
provide an exception for the witness whose testimony is truthful
but misleading? Should there be an exception for the witness
whose truthful testimony is serving an unjust cause? Should it
be unethical for the lawyer to show on cross-examination that
the truthful witness has received an unlawful fee for testify-
ing?
120
These questions make my point again. There should be no
ethics "rule" on the subject at all. That does not mean we should
not say something about it, and mean what we say. As Emory
Buckner correctly stated in 1936, the purpose of cross-examination
is to expose falsehood and catch the truth.12' One must accept
what is true and go on. If the testimony is out of proportion, it
should be whittled down, but no client is entitled to a false
case.122 How this should be accomplished is a matter of context,
judgment, and circumstance. Of course, mistakes will be made.
Read the transcript of Courvoisier's case. Charles Phillips tried
hard for the defense, but conflicting obligations led to mistakes.
Our traditions tell us to strive toward an ideal. Trial lawyers
participate in the truth-seeking function of the adversary system.
They are also respectful of all people caught in the fray, particular-
ly those who come forth as witnesses in any trial. The ABA
Standards in 1971 remind us: "The policy of the law is to encour-
age witnesses to come forward and give evidence in litigation. If
witnesses are subjected to needless humiliation when they testify,
the existing human tendency to avoid 'becoming involved' will be
increased.''23 If the lawyer-statesman ideal were working right,
119. Id. at 168 n.22 (quoting CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 650-51
(1986)).
120. Id.
121. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 7. Compare Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Lawyer's "Different
Mission ": Reflections on the "Right to Present a False Case," 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125
(1987) with John B. Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts Are Where You Find Them: A Response
to Professor Subin's Position on the Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission," 1 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 339 (1987). Notably, Subin had the last word in Harry I. Subin, Is This Lie
Necessary? Further Reflections on the Right to Present a False Defense, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 689 (1988).




there would be no rule of ethics on the issue of cross-examining the
truthful witness. The proper response by the bar to one who
regularly engages in such practices would be not punishment but
disdain.124
VI. Conclusory Comments
In 1980 the National Law Journal reported a study that
indicated lawyers were seeing mental health professionals in record
numbers. Three reasons were given: (1) overwork; (2) forced
aggressive behavior; and (3) constant deceptive practice.
125
Whatever the problem with overwork, I am certain it is what one
does on the job that causes the stress. I am equally certain that too
many lawyers in the modern world have bought into the extreme
neutral partisanship model of lawyering and its corollary: extreme
adversariness. The result is a belief that a lawyer has sold his or
her soul to the client. Lawyers have been persuaded that their
consciences can be bought, and it is a moral bargain. Despite Tom
Shaffer's plea that the lawyer-client relationship is a moral
relationship, one that must be open to moral change and dialogue
in all particulars, 26 lawyers have swallowed the idea that clients
make decisions that lawyers carry out; or worse, even when lawyers
make decisions for clients, the decision must be narrow and selfish.
No wonder there is a malaise. The lawyer's independence and
moral agency has been denied. Aristotle taught that virtue and
character lead to "happiness" or "flourishing."' 27 But a lawyer is
a hired gun, a tool with which clients wreck havoc on others.
Officer of the court? Statesman? The words do not seem to mean
much anymore. With Professors Glendon and Kronman, I wish
they did. With T.S. Eliot, I know they will.
124. This means we would once again understand the difference between a morality of
duty and a morality of aspiration. See LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 8 (1964).
125. Paulette Cooper, Lawyers Succumb to Stress, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 1, 1980, at 1.
126. See generally THOMAS SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS
AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 1 (1994).
127. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.
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